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Purpose: To assess the risk of failure of a recently developed automated treatment planning tool, the
radiation planning assistant (RPA), and to determine the reduction in these risks with implementation
of a quality assurance (QA) program specifically designed for the RPA.
Methods: We used failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) to assess the risk of the RPA. The
steps involved in the workflow of planning a four-field box treatment of cervical cancer with the RPA
were identified. Then, the potential failure modes at each step and their causes were identified and
scored according to their likelihood of occurrence, severity, and likelihood of going undetected.
Additionally, the impact of the components of the QA program on the detectability of the failure
modes was assessed. The QA program was designed to supplement a clinic’s standard QA processes
and consisted of three components: (a) automatic, independent verification of the results of auto-
mated planning; (b) automatic comparison of treatment parameters to expected values; and (c) guided
manual checks of the treatment plan. A risk priority number (RPN) was calculated for each potential
failure mode with and without use of the QA program.
Results: In the RPA automated treatment planning workflow, we identified 68 potential failure
modes with 113 causes. The average RPN was 91 without the QA program and 68 with the QA pro-
gram (maximum RPNs were 504 and 315, respectively). The reduction in RPN was due to an
improvement in the likelihood of detecting failures, resulting in lower detectability scores. The top-
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ranked failure modes included incorrect identification of the marked isocenter, inappropriate beam
aperture definition, incorrect entry of the prescription into the RPA plan directive, and lack of a com-
prehensive plan review by the physician.
Conclusions: Using FMEA, we assessed the risks in the clinical deployment of an automated treat-
ment planning workflow and showed that a specialized QA program for the RPA, which included auto-
matic QA techniques, improved the detectability of failures, reducing this risk. However, some residual
risks persisted, which were similar to those found in manual treatment planning, and human error
remained a major cause of potential failures. Through the risk analysis process, we identified three key
aspects of safe deployment of automated planning: (a) user training on potential failure modes; (b)
comprehensive manual plan review by physicians and physicists; and (c) automated QA of the treat-
ment plan. © 2019 The Authors. Medical Physics published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of
American Association of Physicists in Medicine. [https://doi.org/10.1002/mp.13552]
Key words: automated treatment planning, external beam radiation therapy, FMEA, quality assur-
ance, risk analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Automation has the potential to improve the consistency and
efficiency of radiation treatment planning. Additionally, the
automation of treatment planning promises to improve safety
by preventing human errors and reducing handoffs between
medical staff members, both of which have been shown to be
weaknesses in radiotherapy safety.1–3 While it is generally
assumed that automation leads to elimination of the risks
associated with human error, it can introduce new or different
types of error that are not part of the routine, manual treat-
ment planning process. For example, automated processes
may introduce new or added risks from the lack of active par-
ticipation by a human user who could catch errors that may
go undetected by computer algorithms.
As with any other new technology to be implemented into
clinical workflow, it is vital to assess the risk introduced by auto-
mated treatment planning in each step of the workflow. Further-
more, Task Group 100 (TG-100) of the American Association of
Physicists in Medicine (AAPM) recommends that all new devices
undergo a systematic risk analysis.2 Failure mode and effects
analysis (FMEA) is an established technique for methodically and
prospectively identifying the risks involved in a process. This
method has been used by several other groups to assess the risks
of various processes in radiation oncology practice.4–8
Our group recently developed a fully automatic treatment
planning tool, the Radiation Planning Assistant (RPA).9,10 In
addition to developing algorithms to automate treatment plan-
ning, we also implemented a quality assurance (QA) program
specific to the RPA in order to enhance the safety of automated
planning. In the present work, we used FMEA to assess the
risk of various failure modes in automated planning for cervi-
cal cancer radiotherapy with the RPA. We then assessed the
impact of the specialized QA program on the identified risks.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.A. Description of the RPA
The workflow of automated planning with the RPA was
previously described by Court et al.9 Currently, the RPA is
being implemented as a remote system with which the user
interacts via a web interface. A locally installed system is
also possible. The input to the RPA is a plan directive
from the physician with patient information, including the
treatment site and prescription, and the planning computed
tomography (CT) images of the patient in the treatment
position. In the RPA’s user interface, qualified staff can
enter, review, and approve the plan directive and planning
CT. Once these are approved, the RPA automatically
begins planning.
The RPA is being developed for all treatment sites,
starting with cancers of the uterine cervix, head and neck,
and breast. Here, we focused on RPA treatment planning
for cervical cancer using a four-field box technique with
beam apertures based on bony anatomy. The algorithms
and validation results of the RPA for cervical cancer have
been previously described.10 Briefly, the RPA uses in-
house–developed algorithms that are integrated with the
Eclipse treatment planning system (Varian Medical Sys-
tems, Palo Alto, CA) via Eclipse’s application program-
ming interface. The marked isocenter is automatically
localized according to the positions of 3-point external
fiducial markers, and the body contour is automatically
segmented. Next, the pelvic bony anatomy is automatically
segmented with an autosegmentation tool using deformable
registration of multiple atlases.11 The pelvic bony anatomy
is projected into each beam’s-eye view, and the beam aper-
tures are designed on the basis of anatomical landmarks
identified on the projections of the bony anatomy. The
treatment beam parameters are then automatically set in the
treatment planning system, and the dose is calculated using
the Analytical Anisotropic Algorithm. The relative beam
weights are optimized to achieve a homogeneous dose dis-
tribution within the treated volume.
After planning is complete, the RPA presents the plan as a
PDF document for a physician to review. If the physician
approves the plan, DICOM-format treatment plan files are
transferred to the user. The expectation is that users will import
the files into their own treatment planning systems for review
before treatment and will perform their standard pretreatment
QA.
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2.B. FMEA of automated planning
For the FMEA, a team of subject matter experts (three
medical physicists and one radiation oncologist) first enumer-
ated the steps in the RPA automated treatment planning work-
flow for patients with cervical cancer, from CT simulation to
plan approval by the physician. Then, for each process step,
the group of three physicists identified potential failure
modes and possible causes of each failure mode. The process
map, failure modes, and scoring were determined assuming a
generic clinic that follows the practices outlined in the Ameri-
can College of Radiology accreditation requirements, includ-
ing physics plan review.12 Prior to scoring, the process map
and potential failure modes and causes were reviewed by six
medical physicists at four centers in South Africa and Bots-
wana that are prospective users of the RPA. These physicists
assessed the applicability of the proposed treatment planning
workflow and failure modes to their local clinical practice to
identify any substantial discrepancies, and none were found.
Next, the original team of three physicists scored the like-
lihood of occurrence (O), the severity (S), and the likelihood
of going undetected (D) for each potential cause of each
potential failure mode using the 10-point scoring system and
the values recommended in Table II of the TG-100 report.2
The value for each O, S, and D score was the consensus value
as determined by the group. We chose to focus on scoring the
causes of failure modes individually in order to better design
the QA program to mitigate the variable risks attributable to
different causes of a potential failure mode.
A risk priority number (RPN) was calculated by multiply-
ing the O, S, and D scores. For potential failure modes with
causes that were specifically related to the failure of an RPA
algorithm, we were able to determine the O score quantita-
tively on the basis of our retrospective testing of the RPA
using approximately 500 patient CT scans rather than making
an estimate of the percent likelihood of occurrence. For
example, a specific algorithm failure that occurred twice dur-
ing testing would receive an O score of 6, representing an
occurrence rate of <0.5%. If a potential failure mode never
occurred, we estimated the likelihood of occurrence from our
experience and knowledge of the algorithms.
2.C. Description of the QA program
To minimize opportunities for error, we implemented a
QA program for the RPA that included three types of QA to
detect errors in the automatically created treatment plans. We
applied this QA program, which is intended to supplement
users’ standard QA processes, to all possible steps in the
automated planning process. This QA program was initially
developed prior to the FMEA based on our experience with
the initial retrospective testing and development. The QA
program was updated with additional tests based on the
results of this FMEA.
The first type of QA applied was an automatic, indepen-
dent validation of the results of each step, which is a similar
concept to the independent dose verification used in radio-
therapy. For example, we use two independent methods to
automatically detect the marked isocenter based on a 3-point
external fiducial setup. The primary method searches within
a band around the body contour for the high-contrast external
fiducials. The secondary method differs in that it searches for
high-contrast objects that constitute a triangle topology. The
result of the primary method is used in the treatment plan,
and its agreement with the results of the secondary method is
verified. If the two methods do not agree, the treatment plan
is flagged for human review. Other examples of tasks that
have two independent algorithms are segmentation of the
body contour and creation of the field apertures. We pushed
the treatment plans to Mobius3D (Mobius Medical Systems,
Houston, TX) to perform the secondary dose verification. We
also automatically verified the patient’s orientation and
anatomical site (e.g., head vs pelvis) using both the DICOM
header information and a simple rigid registration to a full-
body patient CT scan.
The second type of QA was an automatic check of the
result against expected values. The expected values may be a
range derived from the population of patient plans, such as
for field size, or a single value, such as the collimator angle
always being equal to 0.
Finally, the third type of QA was a series of specialized
manual checks. One such manual check was a set of specific
questions in the user interfaces for approving the plan direc-
tive and planning CT. For example, we asked the user to ver-
ify that the CT scan field-of-view was appropriate for the
patient. Another manual check was plan documentation that
was automatically created and designed to guide the appro-
priate staff, such as a physicist, through checking the treat-
ment planning parameters.
2.D. Assessment of the effect of the QA program
We next assessed the effect of the QA program on the
detectability of each failure mode and cause. First, we
determined which failure modes could be detected by any
of the three types of QA described above. For each type of
QA, we estimated how effectively that type of QA could
improve the detectability of that failure mode and cause
using a three-tier scale: very effectively, moderately effec-
tively, or somewhat effectively. We used these ratings to
adjust the D value (the likelihood of going undetected) for
each failure mode by reducing the percentage of undetected
failures (from the corresponding score values in Table II
from TG-100). To facilitate the reduction in the D value,
we assigned residual percent undetected values of 20%,
50%, and 80% to the very, moderately, and somewhat
effective types of QA, respectively, based on the likely
effectiveness as determined by group consensus. These
reduced values were then converted back to a D score on
the 10-point scale from TG-100. We then calculated the
differences in the RPN of all potential failure modes with
and without the QA program.
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3. RESULTS
The RPA process, with its four major subprocesses (CT
simulation, plan directive, RPA plan creation, and plan
approval) and 30 steps, is shown in Fig. 1. Using FMEA, we
identified 68 failure modes with 113 potential causes. Of the
113 potential causes, 79 (70%) were subject to at least one
type of QA as part of our QA program (not including typical
clinical QA practices). Without the QA program, the average
RPN was 91, and the maximum RPN was 504. With the QA
program, these values were reduced to 68 and 315, respec-
tively. The distribution of the RPNs with and without the QA
program for all potential failure modes and causes is shown
in Fig. 2, where the overall shift to lower RPN values is
apparent. Since the QA program only affected the detectabil-
ity of failures, we compared the change in the distribution of
the D scores with and without the QA program (Fig. 3). The
median D score without the QA program was 5.0 and was
reduced to 3.0 with the QA program.
Scores for the top ten potential failure modes and associ-
ated causes are shown in Tables I and II for the RPA without
the QA program and with the QA program, respectively.
Without the QA program, three of the top ten failure modes
were related to a failure to correctly identify the marked
isocenter based on the external fiducials. A failure in this step
could have severe consequences if not detected and is not
unique to automated treatment planning. Incorrect definition
of the isocenter was also identified as a relatively high-risk
failure mode in an FMEA of pretreatment steps for
TomoTherapy by Broggi et al.5 The QA program of the RPA
includes automatic verification of the isocenter and a guided
manual check of the isocenter identification in the plan docu-
mentation. With the QA program, only one of the top ten fail-
ure modes involved identification of the isocenter. This
failure mode was caused by the presence of other external
fiducials on the planning CT scan (e.g., wires), which could
reduce the effectiveness of the automatic verification QA
process.
Other important potential failure modes, with and without
the QA program, were the definition of the beam apertures
(jaws and multileaf collimator). We implemented automatic
QAverification to detect gross errors in beam aperture defini-
tion. However, it remains vital that the physician review the
appropriateness of the beam apertures, regardless of whether
the beam apertures are determined automatically by computer
algorithms or drawn manually by a dosimetrist or resident. In
fact, a potential failure mode identified by both our FMEA
and that of other groups was failure of the physician review
of plan quality.2,6 While physician review is standard clinical










1.02 Place external fiducials
1.03 Enter patient information
1.04 Select CT protocol and execute
1.05 Transfer CT to RPA control center
1.06 Approve CT in RPA control center
1.07 Transfer CT from RPA control center
to RPA planning module
2.01 Enter patient information
2.02 Enter treatment site
2.03 Questions about patient appropriateness
2.04 Enter prescription
2.05 Select treatment machine
2.06 Approve plan order
2.07 Data transfer from RPA control
center to RPA planning module
4.01 Physician plan review




3.03-3.06 All 4 beams created (gantry,
collimator, and couch angles)





3.13 Field weights set
3.14 Plan documentation
FIG. 1. Depiction of the subprocesses and steps involved in automatically planning a four-field box radiotherapy treatment for cervical cancer with the radiation
planning assistant (RPA). Subprocesses 1 and 2 computed tomography (CT simulation and plan directive) involve many manual steps from which errors could
propagate downstream. Subprocess 3 (RPA plan creation) is entirely automatic. Abbreviations: MLC, multileaf collimator; TPS, treatment planning system.
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difficult to detect and could have severe consequences if the
plan quality is inadequate. We have previously shown that
nonspecialists are unlikely to reliably identify these errors,
even when presented with examples of correct beam aper-
tures as a reference.9
We specifically investigated the 15 higher risk failure
modes — those for which the RPN was greater than or equal
to 200. Of these, 13 (87%) were subject to at least one type of
QA technique. The number of these higher risk failure modes
was reduced from 15 to 7 when the QA program was imple-
mented, with an average reduction in RPN score of 93 points
(range, 40–189). Physician review of the plan was one of the
two higher risk failure modes that could not be mitigated by a
specialized QA technique (beyond standard clinical practice).
The other top failure mode that was not subject to a spe-
cialized QA technique was an incorrectly entered prescription
in the plan directive workspace, specifically cases in which
the physician intended to change the prescription from the
default or typical value. While such a scenario is unlikely,
this failure would be more difficult to catch later in a manual
check, since the intended prescription would not be the
expected, typical value for that patient type. Automation does
mitigate many potential transcription errors (such as those
that occur between the plan directive and the treatment plan-
ning system). However, the initial entry into the system must
be as the planning physician intends, regardless of whether
manual or automated treatment planning is used. In fact,
incorrect prescription has been identified as a potentially sev-
ere failure mode by other groups studying manual treatment
planning.5,6
We also investigated the 22 failure modes and associated
causes with high-severity scores (S ≥ 9). Table III lists all
failure modes and causes with S scores of 9 or higher, includ-
ing their overall scores with the specialized QA program.
Here, we found that 14 (64%) failure modes were subject to
at least one type of QA. On average, the RPN of the high-
severity failure modes was reduced from 146 to 113 with the
QA program implemented. The maximum RPN for these was
reduced from 504 to 315. Most of these failure modes were
unlikely to occur; 20 (91%) had O scores of 4 or less. With
one exception, the high-severity potential failure modes that
were not subject to any specialized QA test were caused by
human error, such as incorrectly entering the prescription in
the plan directive.
4. DISCUSSION
Following the recommendation of TG-100 to perform a
risk analysis of new technologies to be implemented in clini-
cal practice, we assessed the risk of our recently developed
automated treatment planning tool, the RPA. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first published work assessing the risk of
automated treatment planning using FMEA. Additionally, we
determined the effect of the specialized QA program on the
RPA’s failure risk. This work has enabled us to systematically
and prospectively identify the highest risk steps involved in
our automated treatment planning workflow and aided us in
developing a QA program specific to the RPA.
While the FMEA presented here is specific to the work-
flow of the RPA, the lessons gained can be applied broadly to
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FIG. 2. Histogram of the risk priority numbers (RPN) for all potential failure
modes identified for automatic planning of a cervical cancer treatment using
the radiation planning assistant (RPA) with (blue) and without (red) the qual-
ity assurance (QA) program.
























FIG. 3. Histogram of the detectability score (D) for all potential failure
modes identified for automatic planning of a cervical cancer treatment using
the radiation planning assistant (RPA) with (blue) and without (red) the qual-
ity assurance (QA) program.
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implementations of automated planning. The current analy-
sis has shown us that many of the highest risk steps, both
with and without the QA program (as shown in Tables I
and II), are similar to what might be expected in a manual
treatment planning process, including correct identification
of the marked isocenter, use of appropriate beam apertures,
and use of the correct prescription. However, while the
resulting failures may be the same, the causes of these fail-
ures may be different in automated planning, in which an
algorithm, rather than a human planner, may fail to perform
adequately. We have found that many of the highest risk
errors in our automated planning workflow were caused by
human error. Such errors in an automated plan can be read-
ily detected by the physicist or physician who reviews the
plan, as in standard clinical practice. The results of this
study emphasize the importance of these plan reviews prior
to patient treatment, regardless of whether the plan was
generated automatically or using standard manual tech-
niques. In fact, with the advent of automated treatment
planning, we need to ensure that we do not develop an
overreliance on automation and forego the usual attention
to detail in the manual review of treatment plans. In
general, automation can improve the safety and consistency
of many steps of treatment planning, especially for more
objective tasks such as setting prescriptions and creating
the beams at the correct isocenter. However, for more sub-
jective tasks, such as designing treatment beams or contour-
ing, the automation techniques and algorithms, like a
human planner, have a certain level of skill, so their results
should always be scrutinized by qualified staff.
Using automated QA techniques for plan review has been
proposed by several groups.13–16 Here, we incorporated such
checks for the consistency and reasonability of the treatment
planning parameters as part of our QA program. Additionally,
we included automatic verification of more subjective tasks,
such as designing beam apertures. These automatic checks
add additional risk mitigation without additional workload on
staff, which is especially important for resource-constrained
settings. However, our QA program only addresses potential
failure modes in treatment planning and does not address fail-
ures that may occur as plans are transferred to the local treat-
ment planning system or record-and-verify system, although
we have developed software to check the integrity of this data
transfer.
TABLE I. The top 10 potential failure modes and their causes in automated planning with the radiation planning assistant (RPA) without the quality assurance
(QA) program.
# Major process Step Potential failure mode Potential causes of failure O S D RPN
1 RPA plan creation Isocenter position Incorrectly identified Other external fiducials 7 9 8 504
2 RPA plan creation Jaw positions Inappropriate position Algorithm error 10 7 6 420
3 RPA plan creation MLC positions Inappropriate position Algorithm error 10 7 6 420
4 Plan approval Physician plan review No comprehensive review Human error 3 10 10 300
5 RPA plan creation Isocenter position Incorrectly identified Algorithm error 4 9 8 288
6 CT simulation Select CT protocol and execute Field-of-view is too small Human error 5 8 7 280
7 CT simulation Select CT protocol and execute Field-of-view is too small Patient is too large 5 8 7 280
8 Plan directive Enter prescription Incorrect (not changed from default) Human error 4 9 7 252
9 RPA plan creation Dose distribution Calculation point is inappropriate Located in high or low CT number 10 4 6 240
10 RPA plan creation Isocenter position Incorrectly identified External fiducials out of range of scan 3 9 8 216
Abbreviations: O, occurrence score; S, severity score; D, detectability score; RPN, risk priority number; MLC, multileaf collimator; CT, computed tomography.
TABLE II. The top 10 potential failure modes and their causes in automated planning with the radiation planning assistant (RPA) with the quality assurance (QA)
program.
# Major process Step Potential failure mode Potential causes of failure O S D RPN
1 RPA plan creation Isocenter position Incorrectly identified Other external fiducials 7 9 5 315
2 Plan approval Physician plan review No comprehensive review Human error 3 10 10 300
3 RPA plan creation Jaw positions Inappropriate position Algorithm error 10 7 4 280
4 RPA plan creation MLC positions Inappropriate position Algorithm error 10 7 4 280
5 Plan directive Enter prescription Incorrect (not changed from default) Human error 4 9 7 252
6 CT simulation Select CT protocol and execute Field-of-view is too small Human error 5 8 6 240
7 CT simulation Select CT protocol and execute Field-of-view is too small Patient is too large 5 8 6 240
8 Plan directive Questions about patient
appropriateness
Completed incorrectly Human error 4 9 5 180
9 Plan directive Approve plan directive Approved by staff without correct rights Shared login/Incorrect rights 4 9 5 180
10 CT simulation Position patient Inappropriate positioning Human error 6 4 7 168
Abbreviations: O, occurrence score; S, severity score; D, detectability score; RPN, risk priority number; MLC, multileaf collimator; CT, computed tomography.
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In addition, our study revealed that automation of treat-
ment planning and QA does not completely remove the risk
of human error. For example, the effect of an incorrectly
entered prescription is still a high-risk point that can only be
detected by a diligent human review. To address this, the third
component of our QA program, the specialized manual
checks, was designed to draw the reviewer’s attention to these
important components of the treatment plan. However, there
are still potential failures that are not covered by any of our
QA program, including the specialized manual checks. Many
of these potential failures could be caught by standard QA
steps, such as the typical physics and physician plan reviews
which could detect if there was a discrepancy of the prescrip-
tion or an abnormality in the plan. To reinforce the impor-
tance of the manual checks as we clinically implement
automated planning, training of the users of the RPA will be
vital to overcoming the residual higher risk failure modes.
The results of this FMEA will inform the training by educat-
ing the users on what are the highest risk potential failure
modes that should be included in their manual checks.
Our analysis of approximately 500 test cases was able to
quantify some of the values for the likelihood of occurrence
of potential failure modes caused by algorithm error.
However, most of the failure modes we identified prospec-
tively through the FMEA did not materialize in this testing.
Therefore, the O scores were estimated for these potential
failure modes on the basis of the FMEA team’s experience
and knowledge of the RPA algorithms. In order to further
quantify and improve the reliability of the FMEA results,
more extensive testing will be necessary in the course of pre-
and early implementation. Therefore, the results of this
FMEAwill be a living document that will be updated as more
testing occurs. This is similar to techniques that incorporate
data from incident-learning systems to validate and improve
upon FMEA findings. We intend to conduct regular reviews
and, if necessary, update the FMEA throughout the testing,
clinical implementation, and use of the RPA. By continuing
to monitor the RPA’s performance, the occurrence of failures,
and the ability of the QA program to detect failures, we will
collect quantitative data that will improve the validity of the
FMEA.
Additionally, before implementing automated planning for
other treatment sites or techniques using the RPA, we will
reassess the process map and failure modes. For example, in
planning volumetric modulated arc therapy for head and neck
cancers, contouring is a vital step that has been identified by
TABLE III. Potential automated treatment planning failure modes and associated causes with severity (S) scores of 9 or higher. Scores shown are for the radiation
planning assistant (RPA) with the quality assurance (QA) program implemented.
Major process Step Potential failure mode Potential causes of failure O S D RPN
CT simulation Enter patient information Incorrect name or ID entered Human error 1 10 9 90
Plan directive Enter patient information Incorrect name or ID entered Human error 2 10 1 20
RPA plan creation Prescription set Does not match the plan directive Algorithm error 1 10 5 50
RPA plan creation Prescription set Incorrect normalization Algorithm error 1 10 5 50
RPA plan creation Dose distribution Calculation point not at isocenter Algorithm error 1 10 5 50
RPA plan creation Plan documentation Data corrupted Algorithm error 3 10 4 120
Plan approval Physician plan review No comprehensive review Human error 3 10 10 300
Plan approval Data transfer from
RPA to local TPS
Data corrupted Network error 2 10 3 60
CT simulation Position patient Incorrect orientation Human error 3 9 2 54
CT simulation Position patient Incorrect orientation Standard technique varies
from RPA protocol
6 9 1 54
CT simulation Position patient Incorrect orientation Intentional nonstandard technique 4 9 2 72
Plan directive Questions about patient
appropriateness
Completed incorrectly Human error 2 9 7 126
Plan directive Questions about patient
appropriateness
Completed incorrectly Human error 4 9 5 180
Plan directive Enter prescription Incorrect (not changed from default) Human error 4 9 7 252
Plan directive Enter prescription Incorrect (changed from default) Human error 3 9 6 162
Plan directive Approve plan order Approved by person without correct rights Shared login/incorrect rights 4 9 5 180
RPA plan creation Isocenter position Incorrectly identified Other external fiducials 7 9 5 315
RPA plan creation Isocenter position Incorrectly identified Fiducials out of range of CT 3 9 4 108
RPA plan creation Isocenter position Incorrectly identified Algorithm error 4 9 4 144
RPA plan creation All 4 beams created Not created at the isocenter Algorithm error before aperture generation 1 9 6 54
RPA plan creation All 4 beams created Not created at the isocenter Algorithm error after aperture generation 1 9 2 18
RPA plan creation MLC positions MLC missing from plan Algorithm error 1 9 2 18
Potential failures in the “Plan directive” step “Questions about patient appropriateness” were scored by considering two separate scenarios: (a) when the result does not
affect the results of automated planning, but still poses a risk (such as prior irradiation); and (b) when the result would technically affect the result of automated planning
(such as the presence of an artificial hip, which may cause errors in contouring the bony anatomy).
Abbreviations: O, occurrence score; D, detectability score; RPN, risk priority number; CT, computed tomography; TPS, treatment planning system; MLC, multileaf collimator.
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other groups as a high-risk potential failure mode.2,5,7 There-
fore, this FMEA will be updated to consider the risk of fail-
ures in automatic contouring, and QA techniques will be
added to reduce the risks of these failures.
The FMEA is by nature subjective; it incorporates the
experience and bias of the team performing it. Thus, the
results of this analysis may not necessarily represent the true
risk of the system. Still, FMEA is a valuable tool for prospec-
tively identifying potential failure modes and risks, which
can help to design QA programs to mitigate the identified
risks. Given this limitation, continuous monitoring of the per-
formance of automated planning tools is vital to the safe use
of automated treatment planning. Moreover, because the RPA
is intended for global use in clinics that may have various
levels of resources and follow different practice guidelines, it
is important to assess how any deviations from the proce-
dures and workflows assumed to be in place for this FMEA
will affect its evaluations of risk. As part of initial clinical
implementation, the results of this FMEA will be reassessed
with multidisciplinary teams from each clinic to ensure the
results are reflective of each clinics particular risk profile.
Finally, on the basis of the results of this FMEA and the
experience we gained through this process, we identified the
following three key components of the safe deployment of
automated treatment planning:
1. Training. Training should educate the end users of
automated planning systems about the potential failure
modes, the impact of these failures on patients, and the
need for careful manual review of the plans to prevent
these failures.
2. Manual plan checks. Physician review of the plans
(and contours, where necessary) and physics checks
are essential components of automated treatment plan-
ning.
3. Automated QA. It is important to not only automate
the planning but also to include automated QA steps,
as these can substantially mitigate the risks of auto-
mated planning.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We carried out an FMEA to assess the risk involved in the
clinical deployment of automated treatment planning. We
determined that while automated QA reduces the risks of
automated planning, effective training and manual plan
checks by radiation oncologists and physicists remain extre-
mely important parts of the deployment process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank Dr. Amy Ninetto from the Department
of Scientific Publications at MD Anderson for editing this
work. They also thank the African Cancer Institute for their
support. They would also like to thank the NIH for funding
this work (National Institutes of Health/National Cancer Insti-
tute grants UH2-CA202665 and UH3-CA202665).
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
This work was partially supported by Varian Medical
Systems and Mobius Medical Systems.
a)Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. Electronic mail:
lecourt@mdanderson.org.
REFERENCES
1. Clark BG, Brown RJ, Ploquin J, Dunscombe P. Patient safety improve-
ments in radiation treatment through 5 years of incident learning. Pract
Radiat Oncol. 2013;3:157–163.
2. Huq MS, Fraass BA, Dunscombe PB, et al. The report of Task Group
100 of the AAPM: application of risk analysis methods to radiation ther-
apy quality management.Med Phys. 2016;43:4209–4262.
3. Leonard S, O’Donovan A. Measuring safety culture: application of the
hospital survey on patient safety culture to radiation therapy departments
worldwide. Pract Radiat Oncol. 2018;8:e17–e26.
4. Ford EC, Gaudette R, Myers L, et al. Evaluation of safety in a radiation
oncology setting using failure mode and effects analysis. Int J Radiat
Oncol Biol Phys. 2009;74:852–858.
5. Broggi S, Cantone MC, Chiara A, et al. Application of failure mode
and effects analysis (FMEA) to pretreatment phases in tomotherapy. J
Appl Clin Med Phys. 2013;14:265–277.
6. Cantone MC, Ciocca M, Dionisi F, et al. Application of failure mode
and effects analysis to treatment planning in scanned proton beam radio-
therapy. Radiat Oncol. 2013;8:127.
7. Ford EC, Smith K, Terezakis S, et al. A streamlined failure mode and
effects analysis.Med Phys. 2014;41:061709.
8. Wexler A, Gu B, Goddu S, et al. FMEA of manual and automated meth-
ods for commissioning a radiotherapy treatment planning system. Med
Phys. 2017;44:4415–4425.
9. Court LE, Kisling K, McCarroll R, et al. Radiation planning assistant -
a streamlined, fully automated radiotherapy treatment planning system.
J Vis Exp. 2018;2018:e57411.
10. Kisling K, Zhang L, Simonds H, et al. Fully automatic treatment plan-
ning for external beam radiation therapy of locally advanced cervical
cancer – a tool for low-resource clinics. J Glob Oncol. 2019;5:1–9.
11. Yang J, Zhang Y, Zhang L, Dong L. Automatic segmentation of parotids
from CT scans using multiple atlases. In: Medical Image Analysis for the
Clinic: A Grand Challenge; 2010:323-330.
12. American College of Radiology. Radiation Oncology Practice Accredi-
tation Program Requirements. http://www.acraccreditation.org/~/media/
ACRAccreditation/Documents/ROPA/Requirements.pdf?la=en. Pub-
lished July 2, 2018. Accessed November 1, 2018.
13. Siochi RA, Pennington EC, Waldron TJ, Bayouth JE. Radiation therapy
plan checks in a paperless clinic. J Appl Clin Med Phys. 2009;10:43–62.
14. Yang D, Moore KL. Automated radiotherapy treatment plan integrity
verification. Med Phys. 2012;39:1542–1551.
15. Olsen LA, Robinson CG, He GR, et al. Automated radiation therapy
treatment plan workflow using a commercial application programming
interface. Pract Radiat Oncol. 2014;4:358–367.
16. Furhang EE, Dolan J, Sillanpaa JK, Harrison LB. Automating the initial
physics chart-checking process. J Appl Clin Med Phys. 2009;10:129–
135.
Medical Physics, 46 (6), June 2019
2574 Kisling et al.: A risk assessment of automated planning 2574
